Hypotheticality and the New Challenges: The Pathfinder Role of Nuclear Energy by Häfele, W.
R P - 7 3 - 1 4  
R e p r i n t  
HYPOTHETICALITY AND THE NEW CHALLENGES: 
THE PATHFINDER ROLE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY 
Wolf ~ a f e l e  
December 1973 
T h i s  a r t i c l e  appea red  i n  Minerva,  Vol .  X I  
No. 3 ( J u l y  1 9 7 4 ) ,  and is r e p r i n t e d  h e r e  
w i t h  t h e  j o u r n a l ' s  p e r m i s s i o n .  
Resea r ch  Repo r t s  a r e  p u b l i c a t i o n s  r e p o r t i n g  
on  t h e  work o f  t h e  a u t h o r .  Any views  o r  
c o n c l u s i o n s  a r e  t h o s e  o f  t h e  a u t h o r ,  and  d o  
n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  r e f l e c t  t h o s e  o f  IIASA. 

H ypotheticality and the New Challenges: 
The Pathfinder Role of Nuclear Energy 
W O L F  H A F E L E  
To  those who for many years have been active in the promotion of 
nuclear energy, the opposition of the public to the large-scale application 
of peaceful nuclear energy has come as a surprise. The experience of 
public hearings and face-to-face discussions with the opponents of nuclear 
energy has made them aware of modes of thought and criteria of judge- 
ment which they had not encountered previously. I t  is now necessary to 
reflect on these alternative modes of thought and judgement in order to 
arrive at new ones, and, by so doing, to improve the basis for rational 
action. 
Further, it appears that these alternative modes of thought and judge- 
ment and the responses which should be called forth by them do not 
arise on the occasion of large-scale uses of peaceful applications of 
nuclear energy alone. The new modes of thought which are being generated 
in consequence of the opposition are only adumbrations of a broader and 
more general development in thinking about science and technology. 
In this paper, I attempt to exemplify this development. I will begin with a 
brief account of the development of nuclear energy. 
The Development of Nuclear Energy 
The development of the peaceful applications of nuclear energy was 
related to its military applications in various degrees which changed 
with the times and which were different in various parts of the world. 
Originally basic scientific and technological research was to the fore- 
front. But, more and more, the technological problems of large nuclear 
components, facilities and plants were the ones which attracted both 
scientists and engineers and funds for research and development. It was 
frorn this development of nuclear energy that the phenomenon of "big 
science " emerged as a new form of scientific organisation and as a 
new category of thought about science policy. The use of nuclear 
power for the production of electricity had to be competitive with 
fossil fuels, which in the 1950s and 1960s were temporarily cheap. It 
was thought that even if nuclear power turned out not to be fully 
competitive, fossil power would continue to be available inexpensively 
and in any amount desired. The drive for the development of nuclear 
power came also from an unquestioned belief in the desirability of 
technological innovation. This was particularly the case in the highly 
industrialised states without nuclear weapons.' 
1 Hafele. Wolf and Seetzen, Jiirgen, " Prioritaten der Grossfonchung " in Grossner. 
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The order for the Oyster Creek nuclear power plant given to the 
General Electric Company by the Jersey Central Power and Light Com- 
pany promoted the commercial breakthrough towards nuclear power. 
Since then, 150,000 MWe have been firmly ordered, have been under 
construction or in operation in the United States. The corresponding 
figures for Germany and Japan are 13,000 MWe and 15,000 MWe. Prac- 
tically all of these are light water reactors (LWR's). In Great Britain and 
France, experience in the design, construction and operation of gas-cooled, 
graphite-moderated reactors, which demonstrates a remarkable techno- 
logical capacity, has been considerable. However, it was not possible to 
translate this experience into a commercially feasible operation. 
The development of reactors must be accompanied by the establishment 
of a fuel industry, the operation of which is commercially feasible. Since 
fdel elemenls have to be available prior to the operation of power plants, 
such a nuclear fuel industry is now being established. The problem here 
is the minimum size of the fabrication plant. To meet this requirement a 
single fabrication plant has to serve several thousand megawatts of nuc- 
lear power plant capacity. For many decades, enrichment will continue 
to be necessary since the present nuclear power plants make use of 
cnricbed uranium. Thus far, the gaseous diffusion process has been demon- 
strated as technologically and economically feasible. In the years to come, 
such feasibility may also be expected for the centrifuge process. In addi- 
tion, the nozzle process must be mei~tioned. Again, a large capacity of 
nuclear power plants to be served is required to make enrichment a prac- 
tical economic undertaking. 
After irradiation in such nuclear power plants, the spent fuel elements 
must be chemically reprocessed; such reprocessing is therefore a late step. 
Again, for commercial feasibility, the power plant capacity must be 
several thousand megawatts. The number of commercial reprocessing 
plants in operation today is still very small. Their technological feasibility 
has been demonstrated in the past, even though the scale of these demon- 
strations was limited. If reprocessing is to be done on a very large scale, 
the feedback into the ecosphere will also be very large. This, in my judge- 
ment, will lead to an extension of today's technology. This extension 
does not appear to be a problem of technological feasibility: it is a matter 
of efl'nrt and of funds. 
li chemical reprocessing is a late step, the final stage of waste disposal 
is an even later one. If very large-scale reprocessing probably requires an 
extension of today's technology, this-to say the least-also holds for the 
technology of the disposal of final waste. Disposal in adequately selected 
Claus, el al. (eds.), Das 198. Jahrzehnr: Eine Team-Prognose fiir 1970 bis 1980 
(Hamburg : Christian Wegener Verlag, I%), pp. 407-435 ; Servan-Schreiber, Jean-Jacques, 
Le Defi Amdrican (Paris: Denoel, 1967). 
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salt mines seems a suitable approach to this problem, and demonstration 
plants are being operated today.a 
The picture of the peaceful application of nuclear energy for the eco- 
nomically competitive production of electricity is, therefore, today rather 
a simple one. LWR nuclear power plants are commercially feasible and 
are being installed and operated on a large scale. Those parts of the 
nuclear fuel cycle which must be carried out prior to. or at the same time 
as, the start of the operation of power plants are now commercially 
feasible also. Those parts of the nuclear fuel cycle which come into the 
picture only after the combustion of fuel elements require, in my judge- 
ment, an extension of present-day technology. The later they come into 
the process, the more they require the extension; such an extension is 
feasible. If, in the past, the nuclear power plant was the main target for 
research and development, in the future it will be that part of the fuel 
cycle which, in time, is last. 
A similarly positive assessment can be made for commercial ships 
operating under nuclear power. The United States. the Soviet Union, Ger- 
many, and, soon also. Japan have or will have demonstrated the successful 
operation of such ships. 
Only 10 years ago the picture was by no means as clear. There was an 
overwhelmingly large variety of competing types of nuclear power plants 
and the various features of the fuel cycle were not so readily discernible. 
There are now essentially two types of nuclear power plants which have 
evolved as second generation counterparts of the LWR. These are the 
high temperature, gas-cooled reactor, and the fast breeder reactor. I need 
not elaborate on the technical details, but will observe only that high tern- 
perature, gas-cooled reactors are capable of providing nuclear power at 
temperatures of 1.00O0C. and more. This has certain advantages if elec- 
tricity is to be produced. But the main thing is that, by virtue of high tem- 
peratures, nuclear power becomes applicable as chemical process heat. This 
means an extension of nuclear power beyond the production of electricity. 
In order to appreciate this feature fully one must realise that only roughly 
25 per cent. of the total demand for primary energy is a demand for the 
production of electricity. The remaining 75 per cent. go in roughly equal 
parts into the sectors of transportation, domestic, and other industrial 
uses. The advantage of the high temperature, gas-cooled reactor is that it 
can make nuclear power applicable to these sectors. 
The fast breeder reactor places the provision of fuel for nuclear power 
on a completely different basis. Fast breeder reactors extract on average 
roughly 100 times more energy from a given amount of natural uranium 
than can other nuclear reactors, including the high temperature, gas-cooled 
2 Wittenzellner, R. .  " Storage of Solid Radioactive Waste ", and Tuohny, T., 
" Managing Liquid Radioactive Waste ", discussions on the storage of nuclear waste, 
20 September. 1973, at the 17th Regular Annual Session of the IAEA General Conference, 
Vienna, 18-24 September, 1973 (proceedings to be published). 
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reactor. In the short term, this results in a remarkable stability in the price 
of uranium ore. At present ore prices, only one thousandth of the cost of 
generating electricity arises from the provision of ores. As a result, almost 
any uranium price can be atTorded. This implies that even those ores 
which are of average richness can be processed. In the long run, this leads 
to a situation where nuclear power is capable of providing enough energy 
for several hundred thousand, if not million, years. The LWR of today 
can do that only for some decades. Both the high temperature reactor and 
the fast breeder complement the LWR remarkably well, and strategies 
can be identified which will ease the transition from market situations in 
the present day to world-wide problems of energy demand and supply in 
the future." 
In discussing the present position of nuclear energy, the element of time 
must be emphasised. The development of nuclear energy originally had a 
highly complex and sometimes disturbing appearance. Consideration of 
the temporal aspect led to a process of selection, in the course of which the 
valid parts of this development became evident. Those who were involved 
had to be educated and again this required time. For instance. it 
was through a step-by-step process that the electricity-producing firms- 
and national laboratories too-came to understand how to act in the devel- 
opment of nuclear power. Over and above all this, there is an inherent 
temporal dimension to such complex technological and organisational 
developments. 
Large and complex developments have to pass over three thresholds. 
The first of these is the threshold of scientific feasibility: in the develop- 
ment of nuclear power for peaceful applications, the principal step 
towards scientific feasibility was taken by Enrico Fermi as early as 1943. 
The definitive consolidation of these steps occurred between 1943 and 1950. 
The second threshold is that of technological and industrial feasibility: to 
pass this threshold is a step the size of which is often underestimated. 
In the development of light water reactors in the United States this step 
comprised the successful establishment and operation of the Dresden. 
Yankee. and Indian Point-roughly 200 MWe-demonstration plants; in 
Western Germany, the plants at Obrigenheim and Lingen performed this 
function. The significance of operating these demonstration plants only 
began to be clearly evident in the early 1960s. In other words. it required 
nearly two decades to pass from the threshold of scientific feasibility to the 
threshold of technological and industrial feasibility. Fast breeder reactors 
and high temperature, gas-cooled reactors are passing the latter threshold 
only now. 
The third threshold is that of economic and commercial feasibility. As a 
result of its complexity, this appears to be the most difficult threshold to 
3 Hlfele, Wolf and Schikorr, Winfried, " Reactor Strategies and the Energy crisis " 
IAEA Study Group on Reactor Strategy Calculations, Vienna, 5-9 November, 1973 
(proceedings to be published). 
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those who have lived through the various stages of such a development. 
Let us recall that there were quite a number of reactor types which were 
technologically and industrially feasible but which were unable to pass 
over the third threshold. This is true for instance of the gas-cooled, gra- 
phite-moderated, natural uranium reactors which were developed in the 
United Kingdom and France. Economic and commercial feasibility 
implies that industry is able to sell its product at competitive prices without 
public subsidy. It also requires that the utility companies must be able and 
willing to place orders necessary for such very large-scale industrial pro- 
jects and that the governmental bodies must have taken the necessary 
regulatory measures. It is this last step which turns out to be of out- 
standing importance. In the United States and, for instance, in Western 
Germany, acceptance of their appropriate roles and responsibilities by the 
various partners involved has been a long and sometimes complicated 
process. 
Even now, about 30 years after Enrico Fermi's historic accomplishment. 
the process has not come to an end. The larger public has recently 
begun to realise the dimensions of this development. It is assuming a role 
in the third stage of the development which it did not accept in the first 
two phases. The objections to nuclear power which have been raised by 
certain parts of the larger public must therefore be taken seriously and 
fully understood. 
0 b jections to Peaceful Nuclear Energy 
These objections have arisen during recent years not only in the United 
States but also in Western Germany, Sweden, Switzerland, the Netherlands 
and Japan. It may be observed in passing that such opposition has not 
taken place-or at least not to such an extent-in Canada, the United 
Kingdom, France, Italy, and certain other countries. Generally speaking. 
the main objections to peaceful nuclear power appear to be the fol- 
lowing: (1) the routine operation of nuclear power plants creates dangers 
of radiation; (2) if nuclear power is produced on a large scale, it is irnpos- 
sible to exclude the risk of a major accident, resulting in even greater 
dangers of radiation; (3) since fissile material can be used for both peace- 
ful and non-peaceful purposes, there is a risk, in handling large amounts of 
fissile material, of the illegal diversion of such fissile material; (4) the 
operation of nuclear power plants necessitates the storage and disposal of 
radioactive wastes for periods of time which exceed human experience; (5) 
the large-scale operation of nuclear power plants involves the handling of 
large amounts of plutonium which must be kept out of the ecosphere; (6) 
the operation of nuclear power plants results in the production of large 
amounts of waste heat; (7) the erection of nuclear power plants requires 
too much land; and (8) the demand for more energy which is to be met by 
nuclear power is not real but is a product of manipulation. 
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These objections must be met. Many writers have been doing this over 
the past few  year^,^ but this is not the task to which I am addressing myself 
in this paper. Rather, I wish to reflect on these arguments and to consider 
them in new categories, which will allow for a better understanding not 
only of the objections but also of the answers. To this end, I will consider 
more specifically a few of the objections. 
The Routitze Operation of Nuclear Power Plants: Today's routine 
operation of nuclear power plants leads to a radiation danger which is 
smaller than 5m remlyear. Recently it has also been made mandatory for 
LWRs to make the radiation danger smaller than 5m rem/year; the regu- 
lation said " as low as practicable." The question now is whether such a 
limit is acceptable. Originally the regulatory limit was 170111 rernlyear, but 
the practice was not to exceed 5m remlyear. A large margin therefore 
evolved. Dr. Gofman and Dr. Tarnplin then made it a point to argue that 
not only the practical value but the regulatory limit as well should be 
correspondingly low. Their argument was as follows: there is experimen- 
tal evidence to show that applying 1 rem induces about 20 additional cases 
of leukaemia per million persons. The relevant experiments were made at 
about 50 rem or more. If all kinds of cancer besides leukaemia are taken 
into account, the figure may be as high as 120 persons per rem per million 
persons. Then they calculated the number of cases of cancer by straight- 
forward algebra, considering only 0.17 rem /year (i.e.. 170m rem /year) 
and 200 million persons (equalling the population of the United States). 
This leads to 17 x . 1 c 2  x 2 X 120 X 4.000 additional cases 
of cancer. Their conclusion was that this figure is too high? A tremendous 
public debate resulted with much talk about the effects of poisonous 
nuclear power. It also led to new regulations by which a formal interpre- 
tation of the wording " as low as practicable " was required. The regu- 
lation now provides that the radiation danger be smaller than 5m reml 
year.B This figure leads to 120 cases instead of 4,000. 
The question necessarily arises: why is that the right figure? There is 
of course no answer to this. One cannot argue in the domain of absolute 
figures+omparisons by means of a yardstick are the only reasonable pro- 
4 See, for instance, " The Nuclear Controversy in the US.4 ", International Workshop, 
Lucerne, Switzerland, 30 A111il-3 May, 1972, sponsored by the Swiss Association for 
Atomic Energy in cooperation with the United States Atomic Industrial Forum : and 
" Energie und Umwelt Informationsdienst der Zeitschrift ", which appears in each issue of 
Aromwirtschaft-Atonltcchnik. 
"ctually, the figure which Drs. Gofman and Tamplin were talking about referred to 
30.000 persons, because they employed a different set of medical data. But this does not 
influence the logic of the argument presented here. Gofman, J. W and Tamplin, A. R., 
Poisoned Power: The Case nguinst N~rclear Power Plants (Emrnaus, Pennsylvania: Rodall 
Press, 1971). 
6 Un~ted  States Atomic Energy Commission, " Proposed Rule Making, Licensing of Pro- 
duction and Utilization Facilities. Light-Water-Cooled Nucleilr Power Reactors. 110 CFR 
Part 501 ", Federal Register. XXXVI, 11 1 (June 1971). See also. United States Atomic 
Energy Commission, " AF LOW as Practicable Numbers could end the Radiation Controversy 
. . . .", N~rcleo~lics Week, XII, 22 (June 19711, p. 4. 
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cedure. Such a yardstick can only come from placing the problem in the 
setting of nature. The " natural " radiation is, on average. 120m rem/ 
year. The variation of that figure is high. Changing positions on the 
surface of the earth can easily lead to an increase of 50m remlyear. This 
is the case if one moves, for example, from Pi'ttsburgh to the Smoky Moun- 
tains in the United States. Similarly, living in a concrete building leads to 
an increase of roughly 20m remlyear. In view of both, the average value 
and the variation of the natural radiation, 5m rem/year is a small figure. 
"Embedding" the problem into the normal conditions of life therefore 
does provide a yardstick. Similarly, one should make the comparison with 
the number of cancer cases which ordinarily occur. In the United States. 
there are 300.000 cases per year, so it is this figure against which the 
additional number of 4.000, or 120. as the case may be, must be assessed. 
Many of the opponents of nuclear energy now say that statistical con- 
siderations are inhuman, and that any additional life which is "willingly" 
sacrificed is too much. Human beings have names. But this argument, by 
virtue of the simple algebra given above. implies a causal relation between 
the additional 5m remlyear and the additional 120 cases of cancer. While 
experimental evidence for this causal relation can be demonstrated, at the 
level of 50 rem, i.e.. the ten-thousandfold value, this is certainly not the 
case at 5m rem. It is a problem of the extrapolation to low rates of dosage. 
Such an extrapolation is very hypothetical because there is no way of pro- 
ving it experimentally. Further, such re-extrapolation requires that all 
other parameters be held constant. There is no indiv,idual, with a name, 
for whom this can be done. It is obvious that entering the hypothetical 
domain leads into strenuous debates which become so animated because 
they can never be resolved. "Embedding " is the way out of this dilemma. 
The normal conditions of life provide a yardstick or standard. 
The International Committee on Radiological Protection (ICRP) deals 
with standards by establishing limits of radiological dosage on an inter- 
national basis. This requires understanding the causal relations between 
rates of dosage and damage. Understanding these causal relations, how- 
ever, is only one side of the coin. The other side of the coin is the standard 
of what is acceptable. This, too, is done through the process of "embed- 
ding ". The ICRP shows it is aware of this by making the following ob- 
servation : 
Any exposure to radiation is assumed to entail a risk of deleterious effects. 
However, unless man wished to dispense with activities involving exposures 
to ionizing radiations, he must recognize that there is a degree of risk and 
must limit the radiation dose to a level at which the assumed risk is deemed 
to be acceptable to the individual and to society in view of the benefits 
derived from such activitiesT 
7 ICRP. "Recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protec- 
tions ", ICRP Publication, pt. 9, A (34) (Oxford : Pergamon Press). 
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" Embedding " entails the establishment of a criterion which incorpor- 
ates both of the actions recommended-in this case, the erection and opera- 
tion of nuclear power plants-and the benefits and risks of the 
alternatives. The most straightfonvard way of doing this is to consider 
the ratio. Up to now, the ICRP has refrained from identifying the denomi- 
nator of that ratio. the benefit, on the grounds that the benefit varies from 
society to society and from one situation to another. The assessment of 
radiation standards in a situation of oil shortage, for instance, is one 
thing; considering such standards in a situation where large amounts of 
very inexpensive energy exist is another. In addition, benefits may appear 
differently to poor countries and rich ones. For these reasons, the ICRP 
decided to leave the evaluation of such benefits, and therefore the ratios 
of benefits to risks, to the respective national bodies. 
There is a further point: the ICRP talks of risks. There is little doubt 
that if the process of radiation damage were completely understood it 
would be possible to assess that radiation damage deterministically. 
Damage could be assessed with certainty. Risks of the kind we are discus- 
sing refer to events governed by laws of nature of which we have incom- 
plete kno~ledge.~ If our knowledge were complete, the ratio in question 
would become a ratio of benefit to damage. The problem would not be 
one of the acceptability of risks but of the acceptability of damages which 
are certain. In either case, it is acceptability which is at issue. 
Comparing risks-or damagearising from a proposed activity with 
those occurring in natlare is one way of dealing with the problem of 
acceptability. Another way is to ask for alternatives to the activity pro- 
posed. For instance, are there alternative possibilities of producing suffi- 
cient amounts of energy at prices which purchasers are willing to pay? 
Such alternatives are features of the world we live in and this also might 
therefore be viewed as "embedding ". For some time to wme the pos- 
sibility of energy production by the combustion of fossil resources will 
remain. For the moment we will leave aside the problem of the adequacy 
of resources. The point here is rather that the use of fossil fuel is also 
accompanied by pollutants which damage health. The most notable is SO,. 
Of course a Gofman-Tarnplin analysis can be made here too. It has been 
reported that for every 100 persons-ppm-year, there is roughly one death 
which is a result of respiratory infecti~n.~ In larger cities. SO, con- 
centrations in the order of 100 ug/m3 of SO, can often be observed. This 
relates to the order of 0.1 ppm. Making the assumption here that about 
60 million persons in the United States live in areas of such SO, content. 
this results in 6 - 10 ' . 0.1 10-2=60.000 deathslyear as a result of SO,. 
The problem raised by Drs. Gofman and Tamplin is therefore not peculiar 
8 This is a general observation. See the recent discussion oi' this problem in Brooks, 
Harvey, " Science and Trans-science ", in Correspondence, Minerva. X. 3 (July 1972). 
pp. 484-486. 
Q Wilson, R. ,  " T a x  the Integrated Pollution Exposure ", Scknce, CLXXVIII, 4057 
(October 1972). pp. 182-183. 
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to nuclear energy. It can always be raised when low rates of dosage of any 
toxin or drug are considered. Needless to say, in the case of SO,, as in that 
of radiation, the question of the causal relationship must be considered. 
Again we enter the domain of the hypothetical. 
For each of the various pollutants, such as SO,, a standard must be 
established; the analogous problem of the establishment of radiological 
standards must then be treated in the same manner. This immediately 
raises the problem of how we can ensure that all the standards in question 
are equally rigorous. The question necessitates a comparison of risks- 
or damage--of completely different kinds. How does pollution by SO, 
add to that of dust, and does the sum of both compare to 5m remlyear. 
The difficulty is, however, broader than that. How is a dusty atmosphere 
related to a risk of having a 3 per cent. increase in the rate of mutation 
within a few generations? The time element complicates the issue even 
further. 
Up to now the approach to these questions has been implicit or prag- 
matic. In the past this was satisfactory because the related issues were of 
limited size and therefore of limited significance. But in the life of coming 
generations, with the increased use of technology which produces more 
pollutioll and the prospect of a greatly increased population and a greater 
demand for energy, this becomes a question of much greater urgency. It 
is necessary therefore to look for methods to approach these problems 
in a more coherent and systematic way. Furthermore, the interest of 
mathematicians in these problems has helped to make for a greater 
awareness of the possibility of treating the problems more systematically 
through the use of concepts like the value problem, vector, value optirnisa- 
tion, the decision process, and others.'"The problem of the evaluation of 
risk raises basic methodological problems. Only very little knowledge is 
available." and much work is required in this field. 
The task may be formulated in summary form along the following lilies: 
it is necessary to establish standards for the impacts of certain techno- 
logical measures. In doing this we will contribute to the evaluation of 
related problems. The establishment of standards entails relating. as 
thoroughly as possible, ambient rates of dosage to physiological and other 
damage. At the same time, we must establish criteria and rules of acccpta- 
bility, including both damage which is certain and the risk of damage. 
This requires "embedding " the standards and criteria into the normal con- 
ditions of life. For the evaluation of alternatives, it is necessary to establish 
standards of a completely different nature. This inherently requires their 
comparison and involves a process of decision, i.e. a problem of value. 
10 Rniffa, Howard, Decision Analysis: It~lroduclory Leclrrres otr  choice.^ under 
Uncertainly (Reading. Mass. : Addison-Wesley, 1968). 
1 1  See, for instance, Starr, Chauncey, "Benefit-Cost Studies in Socio-Technical 
Systems ". Colloquium on Bcnefit-Risk Relationships for Decision-Making, Washington, 
D .C . ,  26-28 April, 1971, sponsored by the United States National Academy of Engineering. 
See also, Otwny, Harry and Erdmann. Robert, " Reactor Siting and Design from a Risk 
Viewpoint ". Nuclear Engineering Design, 13 (1970), p. 365. 
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Rare but Major Accidents: Nuclear power plants are made to be safe on 
the basis of passive or active engineering measures. This means that 
engineering measures either act by their mere existence-for example, as 
shields and locks-or by positive action-for example, as moveable control 
rods. Any such engineering measure can fail and in an advanced state of 
technology it is possible to assess a probability of such failures. This has 
beell done in electronics in particular. While small, such probabilities of 
failure are nevertheless finite. If the probability of failure is considered to 
be too high. a second line of defence has to be installed. Safety com- 
ponents must be installed which are redundant. By the successive staging 
of such safety devices, it is possible to make the probability of failure 
smaller than any given small numberlz; but it is not possible to reduce it 
completely to zero. This, then, raises a number of problems. The first of 
such problems was stated by Dr. Starr as "How safe is ' safe enough ' ? " 
In recent years, the concept of failure rates has been introduced. A rate 
of failure of, for example. per year, might be considered. For 
instance, x could be between 3 and 7. This leads into the intricate problem. 
which is partly a semantic one: is a plant of a failure rate of lo-' really 10 
times safer than a plant of 10-V If the term " safe " is clearly defined by 
such failure rates, this is certainly so. But is this definition adequate? 
What is the more general meaning of " safe " to a wider public? And can 
such a more general meaning really be quantified? 
When we ask " How safe is ' safe enough '?" we are again led into the 
process of " embedding ". Other risks have to be considered and alter- 
natives have to be evaluated. Solar power and geothermal energy resources 
must be considered and compared with nuclear power. These alternatives 
have their own risks. If the residual risk of operating a nuclear power 
plant is to be compared with these risks, one has to reflect on the fact that 
the residual risk in the case of nuclear power is not a risk to be considered 
without reference to alternatives. There is little doubt that the laws of 
nature which are employed in the design and operation of, for example, a 
control rod are quite adequately understood. But, for the application of 
these laws of nature, knowledge of all initial and boundary conditions is 
also required. These initial and boundary conditions are not part of the 
laws of nature but are required if the laws of nature are to be applied to a 
particular case. This is necessarily so. The generality of the laws of 
nature results from the abstraction of the elements of the actual case. 
which are the initial and boundary conditions. As an example, let us think 
of the differential equation for a mechanical movement. Newton's law is 
general and governs all mechanical movements. But if the fall of a 
particular apple from a particular tree is to be predicted, the locus and 
the momentum of the apple at a given moment in time must be provided. 
1 2  Hlfele, Wolf, " Ergebnis und S i  des SEFOR Experiments ", in Scheibe, E. and 
Siissrnan, G .  (eds.), Einhelt und Vielfalt, Festschrift fur C.F.  von Weizsiicker zum 60. 
Geburtstag. (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht. 19721, p. 248. 
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Measurement is the only way to accomplish this. This is a principal 
observation. The ditference between the nature of initial and boundary 
conditions and the laws of nature has been dealt with recently by Professors 
Carl Friedrich von Weizsacker and Erhard Scheibe,13 who have described 
the nature of initial and boundary conditions as contingent. In so doing. 
they employ the medieval philosophical term contingere, which is a trans- 
lation by Boethius of the more basic Greek woxd i v 6 6 x o p a ~ .  It means 
encountering an event without beiig able to predict it; it simply happens. 
In this context, my usage of the word "contingent" is different from 
the common English word " contingent ". which has a somewhat different 
meaning but which has the same root. Leaving aside the still more basic 
problem of interpretations in quantum theory, one must make the further 
observation that it is impossible to measure initial and boundary condi- 
tions with the completeness and accuracy necessary for a fully determinis- 
tic prediction of the performance of a technical component or device. This 
is where risk resides. It is not a risk of the type which is related to 
uncertainties in the knowledge of the employment of the laws of nature. 
It is a risk of the kind which refers to incomplete knowledge of initial and 
boundary conditions. While, at least in principle, it is possible to eliminate 
risks of the first kind, there is no possibility of doing so with risks of the 
latter kind. We can always improve our knowledge about contingent 
elements, but we can never make it complete. This restates the proposition 
that the residual risk can be made smaller than any given small number 
but it cannot be reduced to zero. 
The traditional engineering approach to eliminating risks of the second 
kind-the risks which are integral to contingency-is trial and error. The 
engineer learns by experience to make better and safer machines. This is 
close to the scientific approach: an hypothesis is made which is followed by 
experiments, which in turn lead to an improved hypothesis. which again is 
followed by experiments. In this way a theory evolves which is true, i.e.. 
is in touch with reality: Veritas est adequatio rei et intellectus." It is pre- 
cisely this interplay between theory and experiment, or trial and error. 
which is no longer possible for new technologies which are designed to 
master unique challenges. In the case of reactor safety this is obvious. 
It is not acceptable to learn reactor safety by trial and error. Before we 
continue this line of reasoning. another observation is in order. 
Reactor engineers face this dilemma by dividing the problem of 
engineered reactor safety into sub-problems. For instance. the integrity of 
a pressure vessel is investigated as a sub-problem, and so is the operability 
13 von Weizsacker, Carl F., " Kmplementaritat und L-ik ", Die Naturwissenschaften, 
XLII, '19 (1955), p. 521. See also Scheibe, Erhard, Die kontingenten Aussagen in der 
Physik (Frankfurt: Athenaum, l W ) ,  and The Logical Analysis of Quantum Mechanics 
(Oxford : Pergamon Press, 1973). 
14 Aquinas. Thomas. Quaestiones disputatac de verltate, verit 1. lc. This formula has 
been widely referred to in the history of medieval philosophy and stresses the objectivity of 
things. 
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of control rods and pumps. To  use the performance of such components 
to draw conclusions about the performance of the whole nuclear plant of 
course requires a certain preconceived idea of the various interactions 
which must be considered when the components are combined. In com- 
bining such components more contingent elements come into the picture. 
The aim is to minimise the impact of incomplete knowledge of contingent 
elements. Therefore, in designing the needed experiments-which are 
tests, in this context-!he largest possible units are sought. But, by the 
same token, the generality of the conclusion is reduced just because it was 
the contingent elements which led to these tests of large technological units. 
In persisting further and further along this line of reasoning, one arrives 
at a situation where the truly large-scale test can only result in the state- 
ment that a given device functioned at a particular time and place. A 
general conclusion is impossible. Because of the fact that the test stressed 
the contingent aspect of the elements, all generality is eliminated. Reactor 
engineers are familiar with this feature of reality. To  some extent, the 
term " integral test " refers to it. We should recall the debate on the advisa- 
bility of reactor tests of the Borax type," where the argument was raised that 
almost nothing general could be concluded from such an integral test. Only 
large instrumentation could justify such an expensive test. But this refers 
exactly to the measurement of contingent elements. At the extreme, one 
may call such large-scale integral tests " happenings ". 
Let us again return to the general line of the reasoning followed in this 
paper. Reactor safety in its ultimate meaning cannot be evaluated by trial 
and error. Subdividing the problem can lead only to an approximation to 
ultimate safety. The risk can be made smaller than any small but pre- 
determined number which is larger than zero. The remaining " residual 
risk " opens the door into the domain of " hypotheticality ". At this stage. 
it becomes clearer that the concept " hypotheticality " is crucial in this 
analysis. A few words of explanation are therefore necessary. Hypotheti- 
cality, of course, is not a word in regular usage but its logic expresses 
precisely what must be expressed in the line of reasoning presented here. 
Its logic is the same as that of the word " criticality ", for example, a term 
which is familiar to reactor engineers. The rule followed is that for Latin 
words ending in -itas, for example, veritas or felicitas. Such substantives 
point to features which exist in principle and which if actualised, lead to 
the fact that something can have a certain property: a reactor can become 
critical or a situation can be considered to be hypothetical. The process of 
iteration between theory and experiment which leads to truth in its tradi- 
tional sense is no longer possible. Such truth can no longer be fully 
experienced. This means that arguments in the hypothetical domain neces- 
' 5  Dietrich. Joe R., " Experimental Determination of the Self-Regulation and Safety of 
Operating Water-Moderated Rmcton ", Proceedings international Conference on Peaceful 
Uses of Atomic Energy, August 1955, Geneva, United Nations, 'New York, vol. 13 (1956), 
pp. 88-101. 
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sarily and ultimately remain inconclusive. I think that this ultimate incon- 
clusiveness which is inherent in our task explains, to some extent, the 
peculiarities of the public debate on nuclear reactor safety. The strange 
and often unreal features of that debate, in my judgement, are connected 
with the " hypotheticality " of the domain below the level of the residual 
risk. 
Why is it impossible to apply the method of trial and error to ultimate 
reactor safety? It is impossible because the consequences of so doing 
would be too far-reaching. Every country is too small for that-eventually 
even the globe itself is too small. The magnitude of the technological 
implications thus becomes comparable with the magnitude of the con- 
straints which determine our normal life. This inapplicability of the scheme 
of trial and error may be regarded as a kind of cost-or risk. But nuclear 
power is to be justified by its capacity to provide practically infinite 
amounts of energy for even a highly populated and industrialised world. 
This is an unusual kind of benefit which exceeds any so far experienced. 
The appropriate concern therefore is whether the ratio of such costs and 
benefits is adequate. To complete the picture, the magnitude of engineered 
safeguards also is inherently very large, and is hitherto unexperienced. 
The inverse failure rates which relate to the periods of time within which to 
wait for a failure are an indication of that. The magnitude of the constraints 
of the world we live in corresponds, if properly interpreted, with the 
magnitude of the costs-or risks-the magnitude of the engineering 
measures needed to guard against it, and the magnitude of the benefits. 
In dealing with reactor technology, we should realise that nothing less 
than this is at stake. I think that it is insufficient to look at nuclear power 
plants as mere substitutes for the present more conventional power plants 
which use fossil fuels." In line with this reasoning, it is perfectly legitimate 
to look for alternatives to nuclear power. These alternatives must, how- 
ever, be evaluated by means of the same global standards or within the 
same magnitude and scope as nuclear power. To give an example: tidal 
power is not an alternative. It cannot provide the same amount of power 
as can nuclear power.'? If nuclear power proves superior to other alter- 
natives when properly evaluated, it will be fully legitimate to proceed with 
what will then be the truly large-scale development of nuclear power. 
Let us for a moment consider some of these choices. As mentioned 
before, one such alternative is solar power. At first inspection, solar 
power appears to be a clean source of energy. Solar power has, however. 
the disadvantage of being dispersed; one cannot hope to harvest more than. 
say, 20 W/m a. Large areas of the globe must therefore be utilised to pro- 
vide very large amounts of solar energy. The present consumption of 
energy in the world is at 8 . 10 "W; in the future. 60-150 - 10 laW must be 
1 6  Weinberg, Alvin, private canmunfcation. 
17 See, for instance, Hubbert, M. K., " Tha Energy Resources of the Earth ", Sclcntffic 
American, CCXXV, 3 (September 1971), p. 60. 
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prepared for, as the world population increases and the poorer countries 
begin to obtain their share. A figure of 100.1012W at 20W/m2 implies a 
figure of 5.10'2 m2. This is about 20 times the area of the German 
Federal Republic. To take such a step might not be impossible eventually 
but its size and nature imply a kind of impact on the normal conditions of 
life-including the political aspects of such normal conditions-which 
indeed offers little advantage over the impact of other altzrnatives. If 
produced on a very large scale, solar power would not offer a solution 
which left the normal conditions of life unchanged. 
There are other repercussions of the development of solar power besides 
the use of very large tracts of land. The energy balance of the atmosphere 
above these large areas would of course change accordingly. One has to 
realise that such changes would be likely to happen in stages. The most 
probable first stage would be a change in the pattern of rainfall, but not in 
the global average of the amount of rainfall. Even if nothing else 
were to happen, there would be dramatic consequences: the contin- 
uous drought in North Africa which we experience today is indica- 
tive of that. In the next stage, the average amount of rainfall and its 
pattern would alter together with regional changes in climate. One result 
might be a regional change of average temperatures and winds. In the 
third stage, the global climate would change with a change in the average 
global temperature. This could cause an ice-age or melting of ice-caps. It 
is not good enough to point out that even large-scale harvesting of solar 
energy would make up only 1 per cent. or so of the total solar input and 
might therefore be negligible. The question is more delicate than this 
since regional instabilities of weather and climate are at stake. It is 
equally inadequate to point out that regional uses of solar power are 
desirable and clean in many if not all respects. Only if solar power can be 
produced on a very large scale can it be considered to be a legitimate 
alternative to nuclear power. It may very well be the case that eventually 
a combination of solar, nuclear and possibily even other additional forms 
of energy might turn out to be the optimal condition. I mentioned earlier 
that a major effort is now under way to develop comprehensive computer 
programmes for the largest computers available, and to develop appro- 
priate global systems for monitoring weather conditions, pollutants, and 
other parameters such as the CO, content of the air.18 This will bring 
significant progress. But it will always be impossible to run truly integral 
experiments as they were discussed above in the case of nuclear reactor 
safety. The prediction of man's impact on the climate will never be fully 
proven experimentally, or, to be more exact, by trial and error. The mag- 
nitude of the risk which is involved again corresponds to the magnitude 
of the constraints which determine our normal life. A residual risk will 
18  World Meteorological Organisation and International Council d Scientific Unions, 
"The First GARP Global Experiment, Obejectives and Plans ", GARP Publication Series, 
nr. 1 1  (March 1973). 
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therefore remain. Again one finds oneself in the domain of " hypotheti- 
cality " and the debate on the related issues will be inconclusive. 
It is now clear that a similar argument holds for the very large-scale 
" harvesting " of the heat in the earth's crust. This statement implies. 
among other things, that the risk of inducing large-scale earthquakes is 
unacceptable. Furthermore, contrary to a widespread belief, the fusion 
reactors which are hoped for would by no means be a source of clean 
power.lg More systems-analyses comparing various alternatives for the 
provision of energy are now urgent, although it is unlikely that one of 
the alternatives would turn out to be clearly superior to all others. 
The ecological impact of human activities is also of that nature. Once 
ecological equilibria are destroyed, it takes periods of time beyond human 
experience for their re-establishment. In this case, too, trial and error, 
or, rather, the iteration of theory and experiment, cannot provide a 
definitive solution. Residual risks will remain. 
Many more examples of this situation can be found. The tasks which 
we confront in the assessment of nuclear power are prototypical of a wider 
range of emerging problems; in this sense, the analysis of the problems of 
nuclear power is a pathfinding undertaking. If properly interpreted and 
understood, the public concern about nuclear power is not unfounded. 
But that concern is not a simple function of a peculiarity of nuclear power. 
It is, rather, the general condition of civilisation towards which we are 
moving; it is a condition where the magnitude of human enterprises becomes 
comparable with the magnitude of the widest determinants of our normal 
existence. Nuclear power turns out to be a forerunner, a pathfinder, of 
that. 
Nuclear Material Safeguards : Another objection raised by the opponents 
of nuclear power asserts that it will render easier the illegal diversion of 
nuclear material for military purposes. This is sometimes called the 
problem of safeguards. A vast international effort has been made to deal 
with the problem. The conception, negotiation and commencement of the 
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons marked a great step 
forward in this respect. A major effort of systems-analysis and develop 
ment led to the establishment of the safeguards system of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The continued operation of the European 
Atomic Energy Community as well as the United States Atomic Energy 
Commission safeguard systems have also contributed to a considerable 
reduction of the risk of illegal diversion of nuclear material.20 
19 Hlfele, Wolf and Starr, Chauncey. " A  Perspective on Fusion and Fission Breeders ", 
Journal o f  the British Nuclear Energy Society (forthcoming). 
2 0  International Atomic Energy Agency, "The Structure and Content of Agreements 
between the Agency and States Required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non- 
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons ", IAEA, Vienna, Information Circular 153, 1971. See 
also, Hiifele. Wolf. " Systems Analysis in Safeguards of Nuclear Material ", Proceedings 
Fourth Inrernarional Conference on Peaceful Uses o f  Atomic Energy, September 1971, 
Geneva, United Nations, New York, IAEA, Vienna, vol. 9 (1972), p. 303. 
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As in other situations in which risks of catastrophic dimensions must be 
dealt with, so in the case of safeguards also the establishment of standards 
was in the forefront of interest. In order to establish thresholds of 
significance, it was necessary to obtain experimental values for the material 
unaccounted for (MUF), since the accountability of nuclear material is the 
corner-stone of the present safeguard systems. The side of the task which 
deals with causal relations of a scientific or technological nature was more 
or less readily taken care of. To that end a number of experiments were 
designed and executed. The result was that the amount of MUF for the 
various nuclear facilities such as reprocessing plants was established. On 
the other side, it was necessary to reflect on the demands for such ac- 
countability. Was the IAEA system of safeguards to be designed to 
account for kilogrammes, grammes, or milligrammes of nuclear material? 
And what were the periods of time during which the detection of diversion 
had to take place? It was a painful and lengthy process to explain to 
politicians that it would be impossible to account for absolutely all the 
nuclear material. A residual percentage would go into MUF; there was 
bound to be a residual risk in the case of safeguards, as in other situations 
of the kind under discussion. 
What then is acceptable? In the case of international safeguards against 
the illegal diversion of nuclear material, the need to accept residual risks 
has led to highly hypothetical considerations. One such hypothetical prob- 
lem was whether it would be considered feasible that someone should drill 
little holes into thick concrete walls for the diversion of x grammes of 
uranium. The domain of the hypothetical comes even more clearly into 
focus if I report here on the concern that there might be someone in a 
hidden back room in the basement of a power plant preparing plutonium 
without paying attention to any radiation this might cause. As a result of 
an intensive international effort under the guidance of IAEA for several 
years, it was eventually possible to narrow the gap between the demand for 
international safeguards and their feasibility. It was possible to assess the 
acceptability of residual risks. Yet absolute certainty of the safeguards 
cannot be provided; a residual risk remains and therefore the situation 
is " open-ended ". 
The responses which can be given to those who object to the develop- 
ment and use of nuclear power are pretty much the same for all the argu- 
ments. There is one exception. This is the argument which asserts that 
the demand for energy is the result of manipulation and is not " real ". 
It is an interesting question, but it does not involve scientific or technical 
considerations of the kind which I have been treating in this paper. 
Hence. I shall not deal with it here. 
Marginal Remarks on the Energy Problem 
It nevertheless seems appropriate to make a few remarks on the nature 
of the problem of energy which industrial countries are facing. as this 
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establishes the scope for any systems-analytical evaluation or assessment 
of nuclear energy or related phenomena. It is most important to realise 
that the problem of energy appears in phases over time. the features of 
which are sometimes very different. In the first phase of the problem, it 
is the oil shortage which is to the forefront. This phase will last for at 
least 15 years because any technological measure requires that much time 
before its impact attains substantial economic significance. During this 
phase, research and development on the substitution of synthetic hydro- 
carbon fuels for oil are urgently needed. The second phase is likely to be 
characterised by the large-scale use of nuclear power in the production of 
electricity and of coal for the non-electrical sector of demand for secondary 
energy. This phase may last for a few decades. 
In the long run, i.e., in the third phase, all demand for primary energy 
must be met by other than fossil fuels. There are four alternatives: 
nuclear fission energy, nuclear fusion energy, solar power, and geothermal 
energy from the earth's crust. All four alternatives can provide very large 
amounts of energy, although in different degrees. 
During the second phase, preparations for changing to one of these 
alternatives or to a combination of them must be made. These preparations 
will require more than the exclusive consideration of the supply of fuel. 
The procedure of " embedding " is needed in order to arrive at an optimal 
solution. The problem of fuel supply must be " embedded " in the atmo- 
sphere, the hydrosphere, the ecological sphere and the sphere of social life. 
The demand for and supply of energy and their embedding have to be 
considered on a scale which might be something like 25 times larger than 
today's scale. It must be assumed that the world's population will increase 
and that the poor countries will begin to approximate the consumption of 
energy per caput which is close to that of the rich countries. 
This, then, is the setting for assessing the various technological alterna- 
tives for providing enough energy and their various advantages and dis- 
advantages. The promulgation and comparisons of standards, the 
assessment of residual risks. " hypotheticality " and " embedding ", are 
the intellectual procedures which must accompany the technological devel- 
opments of tom~rrow.~ '  
" Hypotheticality " and Arms Control 
It is probable that " hypotheticality " will characterise the next stage of 
human enterprise. The magnitude of technological enterprises will be so 
great that it will not be possible to proceed with the absolute certainty 
that there will be no negative consequences. The magnitude of the under- 
taking and the intellectual impossibility of eradicating all contingency 
2 1  Hiifele, Wolf, " Energy Systems ", in Proceedfngr o f  the IIASA Planning Conference 
on Energy Systems, Laxenburg, Austria, International Institute for Applied Systems 
Analysis. July 1973 (also to be published in Anierican Scknrisr). 
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make the prospect for " hypotheticality " even more certain. But if we 
are condemned to " hypotheticality ", are there ways to deal with it? Most 
of these ways are still to be explored. The case of arms control, however. 
might illustrate the way of proceeding which is available to us. It was 
recognised in the case of nuclear armament earlier than in other spheres 
that it was leading into qualitatively new conditions. The yield of atomic 
weapons exceeded all previous experience and the means of delivering 
such weapons permitted delivery from almost any part of the earth's sur- 
face to almost any other part. The magnitude of the military and tech- 
nological implications became comparable with the magnitude of the 
determinants which set the framework of our normal existence. Further- 
more, it is impossible to develop the art of nuclear warfare by trial and 
error, as was previously always the case with innovations in military 
technology. Hence, residual risks became evident in the field of atomic 
warfare. This happened early and a number of schools of thought have 
evolved to deal with these residual risks and to develop a practicable 
rationale or doctrine.22 
The kind of reasoning which developed in these schools of thought 
soon became very specialised. It was not easily possible for a citizen who 
was not a scientist, or even for scientists who were not working intensively 
in this field, to follow these developments. The debate on anti-ballistic 
missile systems (ABM), on multiple independently targeted re-entry 
vehicles (MIRV), and other such problems, demonstrated this. The 
reasoning involved in these decisions was extremely complicated and abs- 
tract. It was also extraordinarily difficult to propound absolutely conclu- 
sive arguments. There was always another view and there was no way 
of ultimately proving one's own position. At the same time, the whole 
domain of nuclear armament was vitally urgent. It was considered to be a 
matter of life and death to have a strategic doctrine which would deter 
one's visible and rational opponent from engaging in nuclear warfare. 
This feature of being extremely unreal-abstract and irrelevant-and at the 
same time extremely real-and relevant--developed into a serious gap in 
the late 1960s when the ABMs and MIRVs came into the picture. At 
that time SALT negotiations started. For a long period it was not 
clear whether a treaty would be agreed to. But even if they had not resul- 
ted in such a treaty, it would indeed have been an achievement to have 
held the SALT negotiations. In the course of these negotiations the two 
antagonistic parties talked to each other and came to understand better 
each other's rationale of nuclear strategy. It was a matter of enhancing the 
prospect of the survival of the human race. It gave a hint about how to 
deal with " hypotheticality ". 
2 2  A well-known example is contained in Wiesner, Jerome B., "Comprehensive Arms- 
Limitation Systems ", in Arms Control. Disarmament and National Security (New York: 
George Braziller, Inc., 1961), pp. 198-233. 
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This simultaneity of two contradictory modes of appearance is well 
known in the rigorous interpretations of the meaning of quantum theory. 
In order to overcome contradictions such as that between wave and particle 
modes of appearance, it was necessary to have recourse to more pro- 
nounced abstractions. Thus. it was no longer feasible to describe the laws 
of quantum theory-and hence the laws of nature for that matter-in the 
ordinary space-time domain. Only the abstract Hilbert space was feasible 
for the description of the laws of nature. At this level of abstraction, there 
was no longer a contradiction between the two modes of appearance. But 
the translation of statements which belong to Hilbert space in the ordinary 
space-time domain always leads to some kind of strange phenomena, like 
the principle of uncertainty, which are difficult to cope with if such 
abstraction is not employed. 
Nuclear warfare and arms control were the first human activities 
which touched upon the constraints and conditions which are imposed on 
us by living on our finite earth. The rational treatment of nuclear warfare 
and arms control leads immediately into the domain of " hypotheticality " 
with all its peculiarities. Nuclear warfare and arms control not only touch 
the finite limits of the earth; they bear very intimately on our interdepen- 
dent large-scale civilisation in which there are no isolated areas for 
instructive trial and error. 
The Formalised Debate 
Many of the statements and actions of the opponents of nuclear energy 
are wrong and even harmful. It is by no means the purpose of this article 
to imply that they are right. They are not. But they have led to debate 
and hence some of their effects must be estimated positively. These 
debates have positive consequences. The regulatory interpretation of the 
phrase " as low as practicable " in the case of LWRs is one such positive 
consequence. To have aroused a more acute awareness of the potential- 
and hypothetical-dangers is another positive result. Such results depend 
upon antagonists talking to each other and listening to what the other has 
to say. For this to happcn on a large scale is not easy. But in a demo- 
cratic society it must occur on a large scale because, eventually. decisions 
about acceptability profoundly affect every member of society. These 
issues are beyond the powers of science but they are of vital concern to 
citizens. Dr. Alvin Weinberg has called the domain of these issues " trans- 
science ".23 TO facilitate a general debate on these issues a high level of 
formalisation appears to be necessary. Abstract and complex problems 
beyond human experience or the experience of everyday life must be dealt 
with. 
23 Weinberg, Alvin, " Science and Trans-science ", Minervo. X. 2 (April 1972), pp. 
209-222. 
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The licensing process which is required for the construction and 
operation of nuclear power plants in the United States has already estab- 
lished such a fomalised debate. The necessity of taking a position under 
the pressure of deadlines is very conducive to hard thought. Design 
engineers, including myself, have tried to come to such conclusions before 
the formal licensing procedure by strenuous thinking and by prior con- 
sultations with the individual members of the licensing bodies. However. 
these methods have not been satisfactory. Only the formalised confronta- 
tion with the antagonist's arguments, when the licensing body is acting in 
full responsibility, permits the kind of analysis needed for a design in a 
particular case. 
The treatment of particular cases by a fomalised procedure for dealing 
with particular situations forces abstract considerations to take concrete 
form. All this imposes time-limits and enforces specificity and concreteness 
in analysis. The licensing process takes place in several rounds. It is an 
iterative process which usually produces convergence from diverse posi- 
tions. This iterative process in time supplants the iterative scheme of trial 
and error: Veritas est dequat io  rei ad i n t e l l e c t ~ m . ~ ~  It bridges the gap 
which is imposed on us by " hypotheticality ". But fomalisation goes 
even further. It allows a great number of parties to state their case. In a 
formalised debate, this accentuates the iterative process. This also tends 
to bridge the gap of " hypotheticality ". 
In this setting too, nuclear energy, by leading to this kind of a licensing 
process, has turned out to perform a pathfinding function. Formal licensing 
procedures using public hearings are now being applied to situations other 
than those involving nuclear energy. If in the previous paragraph on arms 
control it became apparent that it is the element of debate which is 
necessary and, further, that a stride towards more abstraction is required 
if one wants to meet present and future challenges, now, following the 
observations of this last paragraph, it seems possible to go on a step further 
and to identify the object of such abstraction. It is the debate itself. 
Procedures must be devised which permit the intangible to be made tangible. 
A rationale for the formalisation of the debate here envisaged must be 
e~tabl i shed .~~ It appears that in this respect too nuclear energy serves as 
a pathfinder. 
24 This formula and similar ones have been widely used in the history of medieval 
philosophy to stress things as objccts of comprehension, in contrast to Thomas Aquinas' 
formula. 
26 T o  some extent this is concerned with the problem of the role of scientists as 
advisors. This problem has been examined in Minewa, X, 1 (January 1972). pp. 107-157; 
X, 2 (April 1972), pp. 280-294; X, 3 (July 1972), pp. 439-451; X, 4 (October 1972), 
pp. 603-613; XI, 1 (January 1973), pp. 95-112; and XI, 2 (April 1973), pp. 228-262. 
However, the point which is develop4 here is not exactly the problem of scientific 
advice. It is mther the function of science in designing the rationale of a formalised 
debate. The partners in such a debate can be of many diEerent kinds. Science is not 
~~ecessarily the leading partner in this. 
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